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Abstract
This article concerns the way in which philosophers study the epistemology of scien-
tific thought experiments. Starting with a general overview of the main contemporary
philosophical accounts, we will first argue that two implicit assumptions are present
therein: first, that the epistemology of scientific thought experiments is solely con-
cerned with factual knowledge of the world; and second, that philosophers should
account for this in terms of the way in which individuals in general contemplate
these thought experiments in thought. Our goal is to evaluate these assumptions and
their implications using a particular case study: Albert Einstein’s magnet-conductor
thought experiment. We will argue that an analysis of this thought experiment based
on these assumptions – as John Norton (1991) provides – is, in a sense, both mis-
guided (the thought experiment by itself did not lead Einstein to factual knowledge
of the world) and too narrow (to understand the thought experiment’s epistemology,
its historical context should also be taken into account explicitly). Based on this
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evaluation we propose an alternative philosophical approach to the epistemology of
scientific thought experiments which is more encompassing while preserving what is
of value in the dominant view.
Keywords: scientific thought experiments, Albert Einstein, magnet-conductor
thought experiment, argument analysis
1. Introduction
Since the publication of Ernst Mach’s U¨ber Gedankenexperimente (1897), many
eminent philosophers of science such as Alexandre Koyre´, Karl Popper and Thomas
Kuhn have shown interest in scientific thought experiments (scientific TEs, or STEs,
for short). In the contemporary philosophy of science the focus is mainly on their role
in the epistemology of science. Our focus on these epistemological issues is of a more
indirect nature. We are concerned primarily with the way in which contemporary
philosophers of science conceptualize and study the epistemology of STEs: How do
they try to answer such epistemological questions?2
We will proceed as follows. After a short sketch of the contemporary philo-
sophical debate in section 2, we will argue in section 3 that there are two implicit
assumptions about the epistemology of STEs underlying it. The case study in sec-
tion 4 will then show how these assumptions can be problematic. John Norton’s
(1991) analysis of Einstein’s magnet-conductor STE, which is based on these two
assumptions is, in a sense, both misguided (the thought experiment by itself did not
lead Einstein to factual knowledge of the world) and too narrow (to understand the
thought experiment’s epistemology, its historical context should also be taken into
account explicitly). Based on this evaluation we propose an alternative philosophi-
cal approach to the epistemology of scientific thought experiments in section 5. This
approach is more encompassing while preserving what is of value in the dominant
view.
2This paper only concerns scientific thought experiments. It does not touch upon the issue of
philosophical thought experiments.
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2. The Philosophical Debate
2.1. James Robert Brown’s Platonic Thought Experiments
For James Brown (1986; 1991a; 1991b; 2004; 2010; 2013), STEs are philosophi-
cally interesting because they deviate from the epistemological norm in science: while
“the great bulk of our knowledge must be accounted for along empiricist lines, [. . . ]
there is [. . . ] the odd bit that is a priori and it comes from thought experiments”
(1991a, ix). What is epistemologically peculiar about them is the way in which they
lead us to a new and better understanding of reality: we make an a priori inferential
leap from the thought experimental data to new knowledge of the laws of nature3.
This leap is special in two ways. First, it cannot be explained in terms of sensory
experience, logical argument or theoretical simplicity (Brown, 1991b, 125 – 126).
Second, it is very picturesque: the STE practically shows the truth of its conclusion
to us (Brown, 2013, 57). This, for Brown, is why STEs form a special object of study
for the epistemology of science.
To account for this, Brown draws an analogy with the epistemology of mathe-
matics. The picturesque inferential leap experienced when one contemplates a STE
is very similar, according to Brown, to how we gain mathematical insight. We ac-
quire a priori knowledge of universal mathematical truths merely by looking at e.g.
a ‘picture’ of a particular triangle (Brown, 1991b, 120). This can only be explained,
he argues, by means of mathematical platonism (Brown, 1999): mathematical claims
are true because there exist abstract mathematical objects, and we gain knowledge
of them via our platonic intuition (Brown, 1991b, 121). The epistemology of STEs
functions in a similar way. We gain a priori knowledge of the laws of nature merely
by contemplating a particular picturesque scenario described in an STE. These laws
of nature are true because of the existence of abstract objects: they are relations
of necessitation holding between universals, in the sense of Dretske (1973), Tooley
3Brown calls STEs that produce such knowledge of nature ‘platonic thought experiments’
(Brown, 1991b, 124 – 125).
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(1977) and Armstrong (1983). Our platonic intuition, which we need anyway to
account for our mathematical knowledge, allows us to see these laws of nature, thus
explaining our a priori knowledge acquisition when we contemplate particular STEs
(Brown, 2004, 34).
2.2. John Norton’s Argument View
Like Brown, John Norton is primarily interested in the epistemology of STEs.
His aim is to explain how “[t]hought experiments are supposed to give us knowledge
of the natural world” (2004b, 44)4 or how “[t]hought experiments in physics provide
or purport to provide us information about the physical world.” (1991, 129)5.
In contrast to Brown, however, Norton does not believe that STEs provide us
with any new knowledge of nature: “[STEs] can only reorganize or generalize what
we already know about the physical world and make it explicit” (Norton, 1996, 355).
STEs, for Norton, are therefore epistemically unremarkable (1996, 334): they are
nothing more than picturesque arguments (1996, 336) that lead us to knowledge of
the natural world from premises consisting of “prior knowledge [which] rests eventu-
ally upon experience” (1996, 335). On this view successful STEs are, epistemically
speaking, nothing more than deductive or inductive arguments, and this fully ex-
plains the “workings and achievements of any thought experiment” (Norton, 1996,
339). Norton summarizes his “eliminativist” and “reductionist” view on the episte-
mological functioning of STEs in the following two theses (see also 1991, 131):
(1) “All thought experiments can be reconstructed as arguments based on tacit or ex-
plicit assumptions. Belief in the outcome-conclusion of the thought experiment is jus-
tified only insofar as the reconstructed argument can justify the conclusion.” (1996,
354)
(2) “The actual conduct of a thought experiment consists of the execution of an ar-
gument, although this may not be obvious since the argument may appear only in
abbreviated form and with suppressed premises.” (1996, 354)
4See also (2004a, 1139).
5See also (1996, 333).
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Norton thus intends his argument-view to explain both how STEs establish and
justify knowledge claims (in the context of justification), and how we actually conduct
them (in the context of discovery). When we contemplate an STE, we are in fact
following the underlying inductive or deductive argument that, if sound, brings us
knowledge of the natural world (Norton, 2004b, 49). Norton argues for this argument-
view by showing how different STEs from the actual history of science can be reduced
to logical arguments, and by conjecturing that this is possible for all STEs (1996,
339). We will consider one of Norton’s argument-reconstructions in more detail in
section 4.2.
2.3. Tamar Szabo Gendler’s Experiments-In-Thought
Like Brown and Norton, Tamar Szabo Gendler (1998; 2000; 2004) focuses on the
epistemology of STEs (2004, 1152). For her, however, inferential approaches such
as Brown’s and Norton’s cannot provide the full answer6. Philosophers should not
only explain how STEs can bring about scientific knowledge, but also how they pro-
vide scientists with adequate evidence and justification for such scientific knowledge
claims against opponents disputing these claims. This is what she describes as their
demonstrative force (1998, 400). She argues for this by showing how Norton’s anal-
ysis of Galileo’s free fall STE can explain how it leads to a knowledge claim, but
not why the original STE in itself provided scientists such as Galileo with evidence
and justification for that knowledge claim in their debates with Aristotelians. This
shows, according to Gendler, that such an argument-reconstruction is evidentially
weaker than the original: while an Aristotelian had ways to reject the conclusion
of the reconstructed argument, this was not the case for the original STE (Gendler,
1998).
6That Norton has an inferential account is clear: for him STEs are nothing more than logical
arguments. Brown’s account can be described as inferential as well: when we contemplate an STE’s
scenario, we make an inferential leap from the thought experimental data to the laws of nature.
While this is not a formal derivation, Brown still compares it to some kind of inductive inference
and natural kind reasoning (2010, 46).
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On her analysis of Galileo’s STE, inferential approaches fail because they reduce
the picturesque form of STEs to an inference. For the STE to have demonstrative
force in the dispute between Galileo and the Aristotelians, we have to take into
account that contemplating it essentially involves making a picture of the situation
described (1998, 411). More in particular, when we contemplate an STE, according
to Gendler, we in fact perform an ‘experiment-in-thought’: by means of the general
non-propositional pre-scientific intuitions about the functioning of reality that we
are endowed with, we play the mental picturesque scenario and see what happens.
In this way, Gendler claims to be able to account for both the epistemological and
demonstrative significance of STEs: because of their picturesque form and the role of
our intuitions in their contemplation, they are more convincing than a mere inference
in disputes about scientific knowledge (1998, 414 – 415).
3. The Epistemology of Scientific Thought Experiments: Facts for Generic
Individuals
The overview in the previous section shows that the accounts discussed all differ
with respect to particular aspects of the epistemology of scientific TEs: Brown is
concerned with how they bring about new a priori knowledge of reality; Norton, on
the other hand, is interested in how they generalize and reorganize our knowledge of
the natural world; Gendler, finally, focuses on their evidential significance in settling
scientific disputes. At the same time, however, the overview also shows that all these
philosophical accounts share the same conceptualization of what the epistemology of
STEs should be concerned with. This conceptualization consists, we claim, of two
specific assumptions. The first assumption concerns the epistemological issue that
should be studied:
(Fac) Factism: Epistemological analyses of scientific TEs should explain how scientific
TEs lead to knowledge of the world.
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Brown, Norton and Gendler all assume that, epistemologically speaking, STEs bring
scientists to some form of knowledge of the world,7 and that this is what philosophers
of science should explain. This assumption, in turn, goes together with a second,
closely related methodological assumption about how philosophers of science should
approach this epistemological issue:
(Ind) Individualism Philosophical explanations of the epistemology of scientific TEs
should refer only to the way in which individuals who contemplate scientific TEs
in general arrive at knowledge of the world in thought.
Brown believes that the epistemology of STEs should be explained in terms of the
platonic inferential leap that we perform when going through an STE. Norton ex-
plains it in terms of the underlying argument that we are supposed to follow when we
contemplate them. Gendler appeals to the way in which we perform experiments-in-
thought. The following claims by Norton and by Brown give expression to (Ind) in
a very concise manner: “[t]hought experiments are just what you thought” (Norton,
1996, 366) and “[t]hought experiments are performed in the laboratory of the mind”
(Brown, 2010, 1).8
Philosophical accounts that study the epistemology of STEs in terms of these
two assumptions ascribe to what we will call a (Fac)-(Ind) conceptualization of the
epistemology of STEs. That there is such a conceptualization underlying the accounts
of Brown, Norton, and Gendler is suggested by the overview above, as well as by the
following remark by Gendler:
That thought experiments can provide us with new knowledge9 seems to be
7In the case of Norton and Gendler, the more specific term ‘natural’ world can be used. In the
case of Brown it is not clear whether this would cover the platonic realm. Hence we use ‘world’ in
the formulation of (Fac) and (Ind).
8For Norton, see also for example the introductory paragraph of his (2004a, 1139); for Gendler,
see the conclusion of her (Gendler, 2004, 1162) article.
9Gendler is talking here about knowledge in the sense of justified true belief (2004, 1152).
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common ground among disputants in this symposium.10 (2004, 1152 – 1153;
emphasis added)
On this (Fac)-(Ind) conceptualization, STEs are epistemological objects of study in
the sense that they bring whoever contemplates them in thought to knowledge of
the world.
This conceptualization is not confined solely to the work of the three authors
discussed above: many philosophical responses to their particular epistemological
claims seem to take for granted at least some of its assumptions.11 One problem is
that these are never really argued for, nor are they really questioned: they mostly
are implicit assumptions. We believe, moreover, that this conceptualization does not
do complete justice to the epistemological role of thought experiments in science, a
claim that we will make more precise in the next section by means of a particular
case study, Einstein’s magnet-conductor thought experiment. We thus intend this
case to serve both as a way to evaluate the (Fac)-(Ind) conceptualization, and as
a means to arrive at a more suitable conceptualization of what the epistemology of
STEs should be concerned with, one that preserves what is of value in (Fac)-(Ind)
while overcoming its shortcomings.12
10The symposium in question, which focussed on scientific thought experiments, took place at
the 2002 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) meeting. The participants were, among others,
James Brown, James McAllister, John Norton, Nancy Nersessian and Tamar Szabo Gendler.
11The fact that we have only discussed three participants in the debate leaves open the possibility
that our claim about the prevalence of the (Fac)-(Ind) conceptualization does not hold for the field
in general. Still, the fact that most of the contemporary philosophical articles discussing the
epistemology of STEs concern specific issues with these accounts. This seems to indicate that the
field is at least heavily influenced by them. The following are only a selection of contemporary
articles that raise issues with particular aspects of one of the three authors discussed in section 2,
most of them more or less taking for granted at least one assumption about the epistemology of
STEs: Richard Arthur (1999), Michael Bishop (1998; 1999), Alisa Bokulich (2001), Martin Bunzl
(1996), Kristian Camilleri (2014; 2015), John Clement (2009), De Mey (2003; 2006), David C.
Gooding (1992; 1994), So¨ren Ha¨ggqvist (2009), Ian Hacking (1992), James W. McAllister (1996;
2004) and Rafa l Urbaniak (2012).
12One possible line of argument for (Fac), which participants in the debate may have used implic-
itly, was suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer. The implicit argument is this: Science makes
progress. Thought experiments have played a central role in this. Therefore, thought experiments
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(Before we proceed, we should nuance our claims in the previous paragraphs a
little bit. We start from the observation that de facto there is a certain one-sided
focus in the philosophical debate on the epistemology of scientific TEs. Doing so, we
may well be guilty of an argumentative move which can be found all too often in the
philosophical literature: to conclude from the fact that author A did never explicitly
address topic T in writing (or never explored option O, or ...) that author A opposes
to topic T (or opposes to option O, or ...). Such a conclusion need not follow. In
fact, Norton has explicitly acknowledged13 that he never intended the origin of factual
knowledge to be the only epistemic issue associated with thought experiments. It just
happened to be the most pressing and the one he wanted to address. However, we
contend, in conjunction with the de facto one-sidedness described above this shows
that there is room for a more encompassing approach.)
4. Case Study: Norton’s Analysis of Einstein’s Magnet-Conductor Thought
Experiment
4.1. Einstein’s Magnet-Conductor Thought Experiment
In the opening paragraphs of his special relativity article (1905), Albert Einstein
presented what has become known in the philosophical literature as his magnet-
conductor thought experiment. He presented it in the following words:
It is well known that Maxwell’s electrodynamics – as usually understood at
present – when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries that do not
have produced knowledge (in the sense of justified belief). We do not deny that many participants
in the debate may have adopted this stance implicitly. Neither do we deny that it may help to
substantiate the claim that some, or many, STEs have produced factual knowledge in the sense
of (Fac). But it does not show that all STEs have contributed to the progress of science in this
very way. We hope to show that Einstein’s magnet-conductor experiment, which undoubtedly has
contributed to the progress of fundamental physics, does not fit (Fac)-(Ind). We would like to thank
the anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this issue.
13Personal communication.
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seem to attach to the phenomena. Let us recall, for example, the electrody-
namic interaction between a magnet and a conductor. The observable phe-
nomenon depends here only on the relative motion of conductor and magnet,
while according to the customary conception the two cases, in which, respec-
tively, either the one or the other of the two bodies is the one in motion, are
to be strictly differentiated from each other. For if the magnet is in motion
and the conductor is at rest, there arises in the surroundings of the magnet
an electric field endowed with a certain energy value that produces a current
in the places where parts of the conductor are located. But if the magnet is
at rest and the conductor is in motion, no electric field arises in the surround-
ings of the magnet, while in the conductor an electromotive force will arise,
to which in itself there does not correspond any energy, but which, provided
that the relative motion in the two cases considered is the same, gives rise to
electrical currents that have the same magnitude and the same course as those
produced by the electric forces in the first-mentioned case.
Examples of a similar kind, and the failure of attempts to detect a motion
of the earth relative to the “light medium”, lead to the conjecture that not
only in mechanics, but in electrodynamics as well, the phenomena do not
have any properties corresponding to the concept of absolute rest, but that in
all coordinate systems in which the mechanical equations are valid, also the
same electrodynamic and optical laws are valid, as has already been shown for
quantities of the first order. We shall raise this conjecture (whose content will
be called “the principle of relativity” hereafter) to the status of a postulate
and shall introduce, in addition, the postulate, only seemingly incompatible
with the former one, that in empty space light is always propagated with a
definite velocity V which is independent of the state of motion of the emitting
body. These two postulates suffice for arriving at a simple and consistent
electrodynamics of moving bodies on the basis of Maxwell’s theory for bodies
at rest. The introduction of a “light ether” will prove superfluous, inasmuch
as in accordance with the concept to be developed here, no “space at absolute
rest” endowed with special properties will be introduced, nor will a velocity
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vector be assigned to a point of empty space at which electromagnetic processes
are taking place.
Like every other electrodynamics, the theory to be developed is based on the
kinematics of the rigid body, since assertions of each and any theory concern
the relations between rigid bodies (coordinate systems), clocks, and electro-
magnetic processes. Insufficient regard for this circumstance is at the root of
the difficulties with which the electrodynamics of moving bodies must presently
grapple. (Einstein, 1905, 140 – 141)
Einstein’s STE starts with the claim that the phenomenon of electromagnetic induc-
tion provides an example of certain asymmetries that arise when “Maxwell’s elec-
trodynamics as usually understood at present” is applied to moving bodies. What
Einstein refers to here is Lorentz’s ether-based interpretation of this formalism, which
at the time was generally considered to be the theory “that, of all existing electro-
magnetic theories, [. . . ] best explained the extant data” (Miller, 1981, 131). Lorentz
proposed his interpretation, at least partially, to account for the results of Michelson
and Morley’s ether-drift experiments, which aimed at determining experimentally
the physical structure of the electromagnetic ether by measuring the effect of the
earth’s motion through the ether on the velocities of light waves14. The result, how-
ever, was a null-measurement: no effect of the earth’s motion through the ether was
detected (Nersessian, 1984, 107).
14At the time, the ether was considered to be both the medium carrying light waves and the ab-
solute frame of reference for the laws of electromagnetism. These kinds of experiments attempted
to establish the physical nature of the ether compared the velocity of a light wave travelling in the
direction of the motion of the earth through the ether with the velocity of a light wave travelling
perpendicular to the motion of the earth. If the earth was indeed moving through an ethereal
substance, a particular difference should be measurable between the velocities of the different light-
waves. The Michelson-Morley experiment was a very influential experiment of this kind, since the
experimental apparatus used allowed for very precise measurements: the measurable effect could
be as small as 10−8v/c. The precise difference measured would then allow them to decide between
the two main, but incompatible, ether theories present at the time, i.e. one proposed originally by
Jean-Augustin Fresnel and one by George Stokes. See e.g. (Darrigol, 2002, 316 – 319), (Stachel
and Janssen, 2004, 15 – 20) or (Stachel, 2005, 3) for a thorough and technical explanation of the
experiments.
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Lorentz’s proposed solution15 was a completely immobile and unmoveable ether.
The ether’s immobility implied that it formed an absolute frame of reference for
electromagnetic phenomena, thus imposing absolute velocities. As a consequence
of the Michelson-Morley experiments, Lorentz’s ether was also unmoveable: mate-
rial bodies could not exert any direct force on the ether, nor vice versa (Stachel
and Janssen, 2004, 22). Lorentz had to allow for some interaction between matter
and ether, however, in order to account for the electrodynamics of moving bodies,
i.e. those macroscopic phenomena involving moving dielectric and magnetic media
(Miller, 1981, 143). This was done by his electron-theory. All material bodies con-
sisted of electrons, minuscule particles with positive or negative charge. A body
carrying an excess of one type of electrons was charged accordingly. These electrons
gave rise to electric and magnetic fields as particular configurations of the ether.
The ether could then indirectly act on matter via these fields exerting force on the
electrons (Nersessian, 1984, 100 – 104; Jungnickel and McCormmach, 1990, 233;
Darrigol, 2002, 357).
Within this setting, Einstein now presents the phenomenon of electromagnetic
induction: the induction of an electric current in a conductor as a consequence of a
magnet moving in its vicinity. Ether-based theories such as Lorentz’s, Einstein points
out, give rise to a distinction between two situations. In the first situation, we have
a magnet moving with velocity v with respect to the ether past a conductor that is
at absolute rest in the ether frame. At the location of the conductor in the ether,
there is a time-varying magnetic field, which implies, following Faraday’s induction
law, that an electric field arises in the ether. By using the Lorentz force equation we
can determine the electromotive force F exerted by the electric field on the electrons
15Lorentz had already shown in 1886 that Stokes’ account relied on inconsistent assumptions, and
he therefore considered Fresnel’s approach as the only viable option. Fresnel’s theory, however, was
shown to be untenable by the Michelson-Morley experiments. At the time, however, nobody was
willing to give up the electromagnetic ether, because the laws of electromagnetism, it was assumed,
required an absolute frame of reference. Hence these experiments gave rise to a situation which
indeed called for a solution (Nersessian, 1984, 105 – 109).
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in the conductor, which gives us the direction and magnitude of the electric current
in the conductor.
The second situation is exactly the opposite: a conductor moves with an absolute
velocity −v with respect to the ether past a magnet at rest in the ether frame.
Faraday’s induction law then tells us that no electric field is present in the ether
since the magnetic field in the ether frame does not vary in time. Again, we can use
the Lorentz force equation to determine the direction and magnitude of the electric
current.
It turns out, however, that the measurable magnitude and direction of the electric
current will be exactly the same for both situations16. This, together with the failures
of attempts to detect a motion of the earth with respect to the ether, leads Einstein
to the conjecture (“fu¨hren zu der Vermutung”) that “not only in mechanics, but in
electrodynamics as well, the phenomena do not have any properties corresponding
to the concept of absolute rest,” and that “in all coordinate systems in which the
mechanical equations are valid, also the same electrodynamic and optical laws are
valid”. Einstein then raises this conjecture (“diese Vermutung”), which he will call
the principle of relativity from that moment, to the status of a postulate (Einstein,
1905, 140 – 141).
16For the precise derivation of this result, see the formal analyses of the STE in (Knudsen, 1980),
(Miller, 1981) and (Norton, 2004c).
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4.2. Norton’s Argument-Analysis
In different articles (1991; 1996; 2004a; 2004b), John Norton17 has claimed that,
epistemologically speaking, STEs are in fact nothing more than “arguments which (i)
posit hypothetical or counterfactual states of affairs, and (ii) invoke particulars irrel-
evant to the generality of the conclusions” (1991, 129). This is sufficient, in his view,
to account for what he calls the epistemological problem of thought experiments in
the sciences: “Thought experiments are supposed to give us knowledge. From where
does this knowledge come?” (Norton, 1996, 333; Norton, 2004a, 1139): STEs are in
fact deductive or inductive arguments that establish knowledge of the natural world
by relying on premises that derive from experiment or experience, and when we
contemplate such STEs we are brought to this knowledge because we are in fact fol-
lowing the underlying argument in thought. Norton’s evidence for this philosophical
account consists mostly of showing how different successful STEs from the history
of science can all be reduced to such arguments. Norton’s argument-reduction of
the magnet-conductor STE, presented in (Norton, 1991), should thus be read as an
example of, and as evidence for, Norton’s general empiricist epistemology of STEs.
Norton begins his analysis of the magnet-conductor STE (1991, 135 – 136) by
remarking that many of Einstein’s STEs rely on a particular philosophical view on
the relation between observation and scientific theories18 (Norton, 1991, 135):
Verifiability heuristic for theory construction (version 2)19 States of affairs
17Important to note is that we are talking here about Norton’s philosophical work on STEs,
discussed in section 2.2: his argument view together with his elimination-thesis, which he has
presented in (1991; 1996; 2004a; 2004b). We want to stress that we are not disputing Norton’s more
historical work on Einstein’s theory of special relativity and the role of the STE therein, see e.g. his
(2000; 2004c; 2010; 2013; 2014). We would also like to stress that our primary philosophical target
is not Norton’s argument-account per se, but rather the more general (Fac)-(Ind) conceptualization
that, as we have argued in section 3, underlies the philosophical debate on the epistemology of
STEs. We discuss Norton here primarily because he has discussed the magnet-conductor STE.
Hence, Norton’s analysis of Einstein’s STE functions here solely as an example of a philosophical
analysis of STEs in terms of the (Fac)-(Ind) concepualization identified earlier.
18This view, according to Norton, originated in the positivist rejection of any metaphysics and
its prioritizing of observation over theoretical constructs.
19Norton starts by presenting a first formulation of the verifiability heuristic. He then proposes
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which are not observationally distinct should not be distinguished by the the-
ory.
As we have seen, the STE points out that ether-based interpretations of the laws of
electromagnetism such as Lorentz’s, when applied to the phenomenon of electromag-
netic induction, give rise to a distinction between two different situations: one where
an electric field is present, and one where no electric field is present. At the same
time, as Norton points out, “as far as the observables are concerned – that is, the
measurable current in the conductor – the two cases are indistinguishable” (Norton,
1991, 136). Given that the theory appeals to absolute velocities while the observ-
ables are only concerned with relative velocities, the verifiability heuristic tells us
that electromagnetic theory should do away with absolute velocities for this particu-
lar phenomenon. An inductive argument referring to similar cases and to the failed
attempts to detect the earth’s motion through the ether then brings us to the STE’s
conclusion: “electrodynamics should seek to do without this absolute state of rest”
(Norton, 1991, 136), which corresponds to the factual knowledge of the natural world
that there is no absolute ether state of rest20. The following argument-reconstruction,
quoted directly from (1991, 136), then explains, according to Norton, how Einstein
arrived at this knowledge by contemplating the STE in thought:
1. In the case of electromagnetic induction, through its positing of an absolute state of
rest, classical electrodynamics distinguishes states of affairs which are not observa-
tionally distinct.
Therefore, in this case, classical electrodynamics violates
2. Verifiability heuristic for theory construction (version 2): therefore
3. Absolute velocities should be eliminated from the theoretical account of electromag-
netic induction.
version 2 as an improvement and clarification of version 1, and claims that it was in fact version 2
that Einstein employed, albeit not always explicitly (Norton, 1991, 135).
20Professor John Norton phrased it in these latter terms in personal communication.
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4. Inductive step: This example is typical since (a) there are other examples of this
type, and (b) there is a history of unsuccessful attempts to detect this state of rest
by optical experiments. Therefore
5. Absolute velocities should be eliminated from electrodynamics.
According to Norton’s account, this inductive argument explains how Einstein’s
magnet-conductor STE brings us, in thought, to the knowledge of the natural world
that there is no absolute ether state of rest: it shows how we get from premises that
are rooted in experience (1) and experiment (4) to the conclusion (5) by following
the steps in the argument. And, following Norton’s reduction-claims (section 2.2),
solely the inductive argument is responsible for this. Hence, Norton’s analysis pro-
vides an example of what we have described as the (Fac)-(Ind) conceptualization of
the epistemology of scientific TEs.
4.3. Assessing Norton’s Analysis
In what follows we will point at some historical reasons that go against an anal-
ysis of the epistemology of the magnet-conductor STE in terms of (Fac) and (Ind),
according to which the STE is supposed to bring those who contemplate it, Einstein
as well as others, to the knowledge of the natural world that there is no absolute
ether state of rest.
First, the way in which Einstein himself evaluated the STE’s result. In his pre-
sentation of the STE, Einstein clearly states that the phenomenon of electromagnetic
induction, together with the failed ether experiments, leads to the conjecture (fu¨hren
zu der Vermutung) “that not only in mechanics, but in electrodynamics as well, the
phenomena do not have any properties corresponding to the idea of absolute rest”,
and “that in all coordinate systems in which the mechanical equations are valid, also
the same electrodynamic and optical laws are valid”. He then raises this conjecture
to the status of a postulate (Wir wollen diese Vermutung [. . . ] zur Voraussetzung
erheben), which, together with the constancy of the velocity of light postulate, will
later enable him to attain a simple and consistent electrodynamics of moving bodies
in which “a light ether will prove superfluous, inasmuch as in accordance with the
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concept to be developed here, no space at absolute rest endowed with special prop-
erties will be introduced” (Einstein, 1905, 140 – 141). The fact that Einstein speaks
about conjectures and postulates indicates that he did not consider the results of
this STE as factual knowledge.
Second, the way in which the scientific community at the time evaluated the
STE’s result. There are some good reasons to believe that for many physicists at
the time the phenomenon of electromagnetic induction, in combination with the
failure of the optical ether experiments, did not lead to the knowledge of the natural
world that there is no absolute ether state of rest. As Arthur Miller, for example,
has pointed out, the electromagnetic theories of Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz (who all
wrote before the failed ether experiments) and Lorentz all agreed that only relative
motion between the magnet and the conductor played a role in the induction of the
current (Miller, 1981, 144). And Lorentz, in his Versuch (1895), had argued that the
earth’s motion through the ether, when considered as inertial motion, would have
no observable influence on the phenomenon of electromagnetic induction (Miller,
1981, 144). This did not, however, bring Lorentz to the conclusion that there is no
absolute ether state of rest. Moreover, as Olivier Darrigol has pointed out, most of
the physicists who were aware of the asymmetry at the time of Einstein’s publication
did not see it as a reason for dismissing the electromagnetic ether:
Among these authors [who had noted asymmetries in theoretical representa-
tions of the induction phenomenon], Preston was the only one who wished to
eliminate the theoretical asymmetry. Heaviside and Fo¨ppl believed that the
source of the asymmetry, the ether or absolute space, really existed, and that
other electrodynamic phenomena, or finer details of the induction phenomenon,
would depend on absolute motion. Wien’s and Lorentz’s only concern was that
the asymmetries should have no undesired experimental consequences. The
pertinent question is not how Einstein became aware of asymmetries without
empirical counterpart, but what made them so intolerable to him. (Darrigol,
2006, 378)
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This shows that many scientists at the time did not take the phenomenon of electro-
magnetic induction, even in combination with the failed optical ether experiments,
to lead to the factual knowledge that there is no absolute ether state of rest.21 We
would like to stress here that we do not claim that the magnet-conductor STE does
not concern the natural world at all22. What the above indicates, however, is that
analyzing the STE in (Fac)-(Ind) terms is misguided: it is not the case that the
magnet-conductor STE in itself brought Einstein, or other physicists, to the factual
knowledge of the natural world that there is no absolute ether state of rest. This, of
course, then raises the question how we should understand the results of the STE,
epistemologically speaking: what does it mean that Einstein claims that the STE
brings him to his conjecture – later to be raised to a postulate (1905, 140 – 141)? As
we will indicate in the next section (4.4), to answer this question we need to situate
the STE in the historical context in which it was presented by Einstein. This will
then lead us, in section 5, to propose a conceptualization of the epistemology of sci-
entific TEs that can capture the epistemological role played by the magnet-conductor
STE, while preserving what is of value in (Fac)-(Ind).
4.4. Returning to the Magnet-Conductor Thought Experiment
The phenomenon of electromagnetic induction was first studied by Michael Fara-
day, who captured it in his induction law: in the presence of a time varying magnetic
field, an electromotive force arises in a closed conductor. According to Miller, the
STE’s asymmetry indicated to Einstein that Faraday’s law was being misinterpreted
(1981, 144). This can be explicated as follows:
Einstein is careful to avoid claiming that an equation leads to asymmetry (or
symmetry) in the phenomena because that would be an improper mixture of
categories. Strictly speaking, equations do not lead to phenomena; rather, they
21See the second part of Stanley Goldberg’s (1984) book, chapters 6 – 10 from Richard Staley’s
(2008) book, or the edited volume by Thomas Glick (1987) for some overviews of the way in which
the special theory of relativity was received.
22We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this issue.
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lead to mathematical descriptions of phenomena which, in turn, can be inter-
preted physically – this is the theory – as exhibiting (a)symmetrical features.
In this way the theory (not the equations by themselves) can lead to asymme-
try (or symmetry) that does not correspond to anything in the phenomena.
Thus, the asymmetry is an “artifact” of the theory; it does not “adhere” to
the phenomena. (Hon and Goldstein, 2005, 481)
Faraday’s induction law provides us with a mathematical equation (∇×E = −∂B
∂t
),
which can then be employed to formulate a mathematical description of the phe-
nomenon of electromagnetic induction, in which the motion of a magnet and a con-
ductor with a particular velocity v gives rise to a particular electromotive force F in
the conductor. Theory then, in turn, gives a physical interpretation to this mathe-
matical description: it tells us how we should understand the elements that figure in
the description23.
When the action between the conductor and the magnet is interpreted in terms
of the ether, as the physical carrier of electric and magnetic fields and as the absolute
frame of reference for the laws of electromagnetism, Einstein’s asymmetry plays up:
“the theory [. . . ] distinguishes different cases based on the choice of which body
is moving and which is at rest, whereas only the relative motion is relevant” (Hon
and Goldstein, 2005, 481). For Einstein, however, the STE’s fundamental issue was
not primarily with the electromagnetic ether as such. Rather, as Miller has pointed
out, Einstein’s concern was with a more general tension between mechanics and
electromagnetism: “[c]onsidering the case of electromagnetic induction within the
23According to Faraday, for example, the magnetic field B was made up of magnetic field lines
rigidly connected to the magnet. On this interpretation, the induction law then stated that “the
total electromotive force in a conductor is proportional to the number of magnetic field lines moving
across the conductor in unit time” (Knudsen, 1980, 347 – 348). Knudsen (1980) gives an exten-
sive overview of the different interpretations of Faraday’s induction law throughout the nineteenth
century, and Giora Hon and Bernard Goldstein (2005) have elaborated on this. Both have pointed
out that Faraday’s own interpretation did not lead to Einstein’s asymmetry (Knudsen, 1980, 349;
Hon and Goldstein, 2005, 480). Nancy Nersessian (1984, 37 – 68) provides an in-depth treatment
of Faraday’s interpretation of the magnetic field in terms of magnetic field lines.
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context of a theory of principle [. . . ] enabled Einstein to cut directly to the heart of
a basic problem of current science and technology – the tension or incompatibility
of mechanics and electromagnetism” (Miller, 1981, 164). This tension concerned the
fact that the laws of mechanics were subject to the principle of Galilean relativity,
while electrodynamics required an absolute frame of reference in order to account for
the constant velocity of light24.
At the time, the most common attempts to overcome this problem involved re-
ducing either mechanics to electrodynamics or vice versa. Mechanical approaches,
such as those by e.g. Hertz or Boltzmann (Miller, 1981, 126 – 127), took Newton’s
laws, with the principle of relativity, to be the fundamental laws of nature: hence
they interpreted all physical phenomena as cases of material objects in motion. The
electromagnetic approach on the other hand, with proponents such as Wien and
Abraham (Miller, 1981, 131), took Maxwell’s laws as the fundamental principles
governing nature: they therefore conceived of all physical phenomena in terms of
fields as states of the ether (Wolters, 2012, 40 – 41).
Einstein had several reasons to discuss the tension between electromagnetism
and mechanics within the framework of Lorentz’s theory. First, as Miller points out,
it was “the current opinion that, of all existing electromagnetic theories, Lorentz’s
best explained the extant data” (Miller, 1981, 131), and Einstein agreed with this.
Moreover, Lorentz’s theory was considered by some to offer one of the most promis-
ing approaches to formulating an electromagnetic foundation for physics25, albeit not
24These were considered to be incompatible as follows. Since Maxwell, it was generally accepted
that all electromagnetic phenomena propagate at the speed of light, which was known at the time to
have a constant, finite velocity, independent of the velocity of the source. Within the framework of
Galilean relativity, this required an absolute frame of reference for all electromagnetic phenomena:
if not, the velocity additivity principle – which states that the velocity v of an object in an inertial
frame F moving at a velocity v′ with respect to another inertial frame F ′ is v + v′ in F ′ – would
allow for the possibility of light waves travelling with a velocity c + v in a particular frame of
reference, thus contradicting light’s constant velocity. In this way the constancy of the velocity of
light together with Galilean relativity and the velocity additivity principle were thus incompatible
with the principle of relativity (Angel, 1980, 62 – 63; Ferraro, 2007, 47; Rynasiewicz, 1998, 163).
25As an approach to formulating an electromagnetic view of nature, Lorentz’s theory was pri-
marily popular with other proponents of the electromagnetic view, such as e.g. Abraham. Lorentz
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without problems (Miller, 1981, 75 – 86; Darrigol, 1996, 277). A final reason was that
Lorentz’s theory, for Einstein, embodied what was responsible for the ‘incompatible
tension’ between mechanics and electromagnetism. As we have seen in section 4.1,
Lorentz attempted to resolve the incompatibility between mechanics and electro-
magnetism by postulating two fundamental entities, i.e. the ether and his electrons,
between which there was no direct interaction possible. As Miller puts it, Einstein
was struck by this dualism: “Why should both particle and field be considered as
elementary?” (1981, 131).
At the time, most proposed solutions to the tension between mechanics and
electromagnetism started with a particular set of models – either mechanical models
in terms of material objects in motion governed by Newton’s laws or electrodynamical
models formulated in terms of fields in the ether obeying Maxwell’s equations – which
they assumed to be sufficient to explain all features of the physical world.26
According to Einstein, however, such approaches could not prove fruitful here,
since they did not address what was actually responsible for the tension. Proponents
of both the mechanical and the electromagnetic approach assumed that only one of
the two principles – relativity or constant velocity of light – could be fundamental,
and that, because of their incompatibility, the other had to be reduced. According
to Einstein, however, the two principles were only “seemingly incompatible”, as he
stated after his presentation of the magnet-conductor STE (1905). What was re-
himself did not fully commit to an all-encompassing electromagnetic view of nature (Darrigol, 1996,
278).
26The way in which Einstein’s special theory of relativity differs from e.g. the electromagnetic
and mechanical view of nature is often expressed in terms of Einstein’s own distinction between
theories of principle and constructive theories, which he formulated in (1919). In Miller’s (1981)
account of the emergence of the special theory of relativity, for example, it plays a central role.
There are, however, some historical difficulties with analysing the epistemology of Einstein’s STE
(1905) in terms of an epistemological distinction that Einstein formulated in (1919). For one, there
is no way to exclude the possibility that his epistemological interpretation (in 1919) of the special
theory of relativity was influenced by its later success, or by some of his other scientific endeavors.
We have therefore decided not to put too much emphasis on this distinction here. (We would like
to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this issue.)
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sponsible for the tension, according to Einstein, was not the incompatibility of the
two principles themselves, but rather the distinct transformation rules that they em-
ployed. These were the principles that ensured that their respective laws, Newton’s
laws and Maxwell’s equations, were the same from different viewpoints, i.e. between
different frames of reference: the Galilean transformations for the laws of mechanics,
and Lorentz’s transformations for the laws of electrodynamics27. These transforma-
tions relied on different, and incompatible, notions of time and simultaneity, and this
is what Einstein took to be the real cause of the tension:
[T]he mathematical statement of the “principle of relativity” from mechan-
ics (the Galilean transformations) did not leave unchanged the equations of
Lorentz’s electrodynamics. [. . . ] Lorentz’s modified Galilean transformations
did not leave unchanged the laws of mechanics. [. . . ] [T]he transformation rules
for the laws of mechanics and of electromagnetism depended upon two differ-
ent notions of time, one physical the other mathematical, despite Lorentz’s
goal of unification. Thus whereas current physics considered a tension to exist
between mechanics and electromagnetism that was rooted in the inability of
mechanics to describe the velocity of light, Einstein delved deeper and found
that current physics rendered mechanics and electromagnetism incompatible.
(Miller, 1981, 189)
According to Einstein, neither mechanical nor electromagnetic attempts could prove
fruitful here, since their transformation principles inherently relied on different, in-
compatible notions of time and of the simultaneity of distinct events in particular28.
What was needed to overcome the tension, rather, was a reconceptualization of these
notions that fitted both principles that were in fact only “apparently incompatible”.
This reconceptualization could then in turn be employed to construct a theory for
27Stachel and Janssen (2004) provide a good and extensive account of how the tension between
these two principles played out in physics at the time.
28Miller (1981, 123 – 137) provides an extensive overview of Einstein’s problems with both the
mechanical and the electromagnetic approach.
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the electrodynamics of moving bodies that obeyed both principles and made use of
the same transformations29. It is in this way that the special theory of relativity
proposes to overcome the tension between mechanics and electromagnetism in such
a way that “the introduction of a light ether will prove to be superfluous”: the
two postulated principles constrain the formulation of the kinematics that is to be
employed in the interpretation of the laws of electromagnetism, which results in an
electrodynamics of moving bodies that obeys both the principle of relativity and the
postulated constancy of the velocity of light. (Stachel, 2002, 164 – 165).
So how should we understand the role that the magnet-conductor STE played
in this dismissal of the light ether, if it does not concern knowledge of the natural
world? In a manuscript from 1920, Einstein himself described the STE’s effect as
follows:
The idea . . . that these were two, in principle different cases was unbearable
for me. The difference between the two, I was convinced, could only be a
difference in choice of standpoint and not a real difference. Judged from the
magnet, there was certainly no electric field present. Judged from the electric
circuit, there certainly was one present. Thus the existence of the electric field
was a relative one, according to the state of motion of the coordinate system
used, and only the electric and magnetic field together could be ascribed a
kind of objective reality, apart from the state of motion of the observer or the
coordinate system. The phenomenon of magneto-electric induction compelled
me to postulate the (special) principle of relativity. [Footnote by Einstein:]
The difficulty that had to be overcome was in the constancy of the velocity
of light in a vacuum which I had first thought I would have to give up. Only
after groping for years did I notice that the difficulty rests on the arbitrariness
of the kinematical fundamental concepts. (Miller, 1981, 145)
29Einstein proposed such a radically new interpretation of the concepts of simultaneity, space and
time, in section I of his (1905) article, right after his presentation of the STE, and right before he
proposed a reformulated kinematics (part I) and electrodynamics (part II). (Angel, 1980, 63 – 81),
(Miller, 1981, 185 – 206), (DiSalle, 2006, 98– 111), (Darrigol, 2006, 20 – 26) and (Ferraro, 2007, 47
– 95) all offer thorough and technical overviews of Einstein’s proposal.
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The STE suggested, according to Einstein, that to overcome the asymmetry, the
difference between the two situations – electromagnetic induction with and without
electric field – should reflect merely a difference in viewpoint and not a real dif-
ference: while an observer in the rest-frame of the conductor would then describe
the phenomenon in terms of an electric field, an observer in the rest-frame of the
magnet would describe it without. In general, however, it would only make sense
to speak about the electromagnetic field as a whole. This is what Einstein means
with the electric field’s relative existence: “the distinction between an electric field
and a magnetic field in the case of moving bodies is meaningless; there is only an
electromagnetic field which may be perceived differently by different observers” (Hon
and Goldstein, 2005, 483).
Epistemologically speaking, the magnet-conductor STE puts Einstein on the way
towards a covariant interpretation of the laws of electrodynamics, i.e. one that makes
them come out true in every inertial frame of reference.30 Such an interpretation
would allow him to overcome the asymmetry pointed out in the STE. More in par-
ticular, we claim, the STE contributes to this both on a methodological and on an
ontological level, without reaching decisive outcomes at either level in itself.
The methodological level concerns the practice of formulating such an interpre-
tation. As we have indicated earlier – see the quote by Darrigol on page 17 –, most
physicists at the time did not take the asymmetry to argue against ether-based inter-
pretations of the laws of electromagnetism. Einstein was dissatisfied with approaches
that attempted to reduce the whole of physics to one kind of model, be it mechan-
30Making the laws of electrodynamics covariant means devising a procedure that enables us to
transform the laws of electrodynamics from one inertial frame of reference to another while making
them come out true in every frame. Here this comes down to the following. The phenomenon of
electromagnetic induction can be described both with and without an electric field, depending on the
frame of reference of the observer. For both observers, however, the Maxwell equations should say
exactly the same: the direction and magnitude of the current should be equal. The transformation
principles should ensure this: they should provide us with a principled way to keep the laws of
electrodynamics come out true when transforming from one inertial frame where electromagnetic
induction is described with an electric field to an inertial frame where it is described without.
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ical or electromagnetic, and he believed that progress could be made primarily by
focussing on the principles that are to constrain the construction of theories and
models for particular phenomena. Now, as Arthur Miller has pointed out, “elec-
tromagnetic induction involved both mechanics and electromagnetism” (1981, 163):
the induction of an electric current in the conductor is a consequence purely of the
relative motion of the magnet and the conductor. Within the context of Einstein’s
focus on constraining principles, the STE then suggests to Einstein that electromag-
netic phenomena such as electromagnetic induction obey both the principle of the
constancy of the velocity of light as well as the principle of relativity. The STE thus
provides him with the principles that are to constrain the formulation of his interpre-
tation of the laws of electromagnetism. This in itself, however, is not yet sufficient to
arrive at an approach that can overcome the asymmetry: as Einstein himself points
out – see the quotes both on page 9 and on page 23 –, a renewed attention for the
kinematics that is to be employed in formulating a relativistic covariant interpreta-
tion of the laws of electromagnetism is also required. This is why the asymmetry
only gets resolved in part II, §6 of Einstein’s (1905) article (Rynasiewicz, 1998, 160
– 163). Hence, the STE forms part of Einstein’s attempt to shift the methodology
employed in the foundations of physics.
The ontological level concerns what such an interpretation tells us that there is.
As we have indicated earlier, the STE brought Einstein to the relative existence of
the electric field: see the quote on page 23. More in particular, as John Norton
himself has argued, the STE brought Einstein to the principle for transforming the
electric field from one inertial frame to another: E = E′ + (1/c)(v ×H′) (Norton,
2004c, 51).31 This counts as an ontological contribution, since the special theory
31In short, the STE accomplishes this as follows. If, following the principle of relativity, we
take both situations in the STE to be descriptions of the same phenomenon from different inertial
frames of reference, then we notice that the electric field changes from E = 0 in the rest-frame
of the magnet to E′ = E + (1/c)(v ×H′) in the rest-frame of the conductor. Important to note,
however, is that the STE itself does not provide the full set of frame transformations, as Norton
himself also stresses: “it is unlikely that Einstein inferred directly to the [complete] first order
Lorentz transformations from the magnet and conductor thought experiment” (2004c, 52). This is
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of relativity was the first to introduce symmetries and covariant transformations as
criteria for assessing objective existence within physical theories(DiSalle, 2009; Kosso,
2003; Martin, 2003).32 Again, however, this suggestion in itself is not sufficient to
overcome the asymmetry, since the same formal principles were employed by Lorentz
to transform problems in electrodynamics to an absolute rest frame, the ether (Miller,
1981, 34). What is needed to overcome the asymmetry, in addition to these covariant
transformations, is, again, Einstein’s kinematics with its reconceptualization of time.
Hence, the STE forms part of Einstein’s attempt to shift the objects studied in
the foundations of physics (i.e. those characteristics that are covariant under the
transformation procedures).
Summing up, the STE was part of Einstein’s attempt to shift the standards
of scientific epistemology for fundamental physics towards a new methodology for
interpreting the laws of physics and towards a new ontology of science. The new
ontological interpretation has it that the objective characteristics with which phys-
ical theories should be concerned are those that are covariant under the relativistic
transformation procedures. The new methodology says that the formulation of such
theories should be constrained by both the principle of relativity and the light pos-
tulate, where those are only compatible when we make use of Einstein’s conception
of simultaneity. The magnet-conductor STE participated in this shift by suggest-
ing both the principles that are to constrain Einstein’s interpretation of the laws of
electrodynamics and the covariant transformation principle for the electric field. In
themselves, however, these suggestions do not prove that the light ether is superflu-
ous; hence they do not lead to the factual knowledge that there is no absolute ether
state of rest.
so because the magnetic field does not differ between the two situations: B = B′. Hence the same
reasoning as for the electric field does not apply: we cannot infer the magnetic field’s transformation
rule B = B′ − (1/c)(v ×E′) directly from the magnet-conductor STE (Norton, 2004c, 52).
32We would like to thank a referee for pressing us on this issue.
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5. An Alternative Proposal: Thought Experiments Transforming Context
In sections 2 and 3 we pointed out that the contemporary philosophical debate
on the epistemological role of STEs studied them in terms of a particular concep-
tualization, which we characterized as (Fac)-(Ind). In section 4, we discussed John
Norton’s analysis of Einstein’s magnet-conductor STE as an example of a philo-
sophical analysis based on this conceptualization. We pointed out that there were
historical reasons to doubt Norton’s (Fac)-(Ind) claim that the magnet-conductor
STE brought Einstein, or other scientists for that matter, to the knowledge of the
natural world that there is no absolute ether state of rest. We then returned to
Einstein’s STE in order to clarify its epistemological role. This revealed that the
STE played an important part in Einstein’s attempt to shift the epistemological
standards of fundamental physics at the time, by suggesting ways to reconceive both
its methodology and its ontology. At the same time, however, we also pointed out
that the STE did not accomplish this by itself. Other elements of Einstein’s paper
(1905), such as his reconceptualization of simultaneity, also played an important role.
Moreover, as e.g. Michel Janssen points out, even Einstein’s article as a whole was
only part of this shift: “Einstein’s introduction of the special theory of relativity
in 1905 is best understood as one of the catalysts of a much broader revolution in
early twentieth-century physics” (Janssen, 2002a, 431). Our aim in this section is to
clarify what we take to be some of the general lessons for the epistemology of STEs.
Philosophical accounts relying on (Fac) assume that STEs lead to knowledge of
the world, but Einstein’s magnet-conductor experiment runs counter to this assump-
tion. It did not lead to the factual knowledge that there is no absolute ether state
of rest. Instead it was part of a broader epistemological transformation of the way
in which physicists should interpret the laws of physics (both on a methodological
and on an ontological level). In order to account for this, we propose the following
metaphilosophical assumption as an alternative to (Fac):
(Tra) Transformationism: Epistemological analyses of scientific TEs should account for
the role scientific TEs play in the transformation of their epistemological context.
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The most important difference with (Fac) is that (Tra) is less restrictive with respect
to a STE’s epistemological result. Unlike (Fac) it does not assume that this always
concerns knowledge of the world. Hence (Tra) does not clash with the epistemological
role of the magnet-conductor STE.
(Tra) does not dispute that particular STEs can bring about knowledge, but it
does not require it either. There are other kinds of epistemic transformations as
well that can occur because of a STE besides bringing about knowledge. In this
way we hope to accomplish the central purpose of this article: to argue against the
assumption (Fac) that the epistemology of STEs merely concerns knowledge of the
world. The epistemological role of STEs can be broader than that.
Proposing (Tra) as an alternative to (Fac) also brings us to shift our focus from the
individual contemplating the STE in thought (Ind) to its broader scientific context.
Hence we propose to replace (Ind) with another, more encompassing metaphilosoph-
ical assumption:
(Con) Contextualism: Philosophical accounts of the epistemology of scientific TEs should
refer to the way in which scientific TEs bring about changes within the relevant
scientific context, where this context is constituted by the historical elements involved
in the formulation, presentation and reception of the STE.
The most important difference with (Ind) is that (Con) does not assume that the
epistemological transformations brought about by the STE — be they the establish-
ment of knowledge, the shifting of epistemological standards or still something else
— should be explained solely in terms of generic individuals contemplating the STE
in thought. Rather, (Con) refers to the broader historical and scientific context in
which the STE was formulated, presented and received, and it urges us to be explicit
about the elements of the scientific context that played a role in the transformation
brought about by the STE. Such a contextualization of the STE’s epistemological
result is needed in order to account for the fact – see page 17 – that different scien-
tists drew different conclusions from the fact that ether-based theoretical descriptions
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of electromagnetic phenomena gave rise to asymmetries of the kind pointed out by
Einstein.
We would like to stress here that we do not claim that philosophers working
within a (Fac)-(Ind)-conceptualization are wholly oblivious to, or unconcerned with,
the theoretical and social context of STEs. In fact, Norton repeatedly endorses the
role of, and influence on, contextual features in his historical work. But we argue
against the (Ind)-assumption that, with respect to the epistemology of STEs, only the
individual contemplating the STE is what counts. Recall Norton’s slogan that STEs
are just what you thought (1996, 366) or Brown’s claim that they are performed in
the laboratory of the mind (2010, 1).33
(Con)-(Tra) leads to the following analysis of the magnet-conductor in terms of
the transformations that occured in the context of the debates on the foundations of
physics, due to its formulation, presentation and reception:
A first change that we have observed was the derivation of the transformation
rule for the electric field, which can be accounted for in terms of a formal derivation
within the framework of Lorentz’s electrodynamics, as John Norton has done in
one of his historical articles on Einstein’s special relativity (2004c). We thus have
our first historical constituent of the STE’s context: the Maxwell-Lorentz theory of
electromagnetism.
A second change that we have observed in section 4.4 was Einstein’s focus on
principles that should constrain the interpretation of the laws of physics, which
brought him to postulate the principle of relativity and the light postulate. We can
account for this in terms of his views on the debate between the electromagnetic
and the mechanical approaches, and his views on the formulation and evaluation
of scientific theories. These provide us with the second constituent of the magnet-
conductor STE’s context: the individual scientist Albert Einstein.
A third change concerns the way in which the scientific community at the time
33We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this issue.
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reacted to the STE within the framework of special relativity. We have not discussed
this in much detail, but Stanley Goldberg (1984, 179 – 320) has provided an extensive
overview of the way in which scientists in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and
the United States responded to the general conclusions of special relativity between
1905 and 1911.34 According to Goldberg, the initial scientific reaction to special
relativity in fact consisted of what he describes as “national styles” (Goldberg, 1984,
xiv): the reaction in Germany differed e.g. strongly from the reaction in France
or in the United States, differences which Goldberg accounts for by referring e.g.
to the kind of education that scientists enjoyed in these respective countries or to
the leading scientific figures in these countries at the time.35 This then provides
us with a third constituent of the STE’s context: the debates in the fundamental
physics-community at the time of Einstein’s publication.
This historical context allows us to account for the epistemological transformation
that occured because of the STE. More in particular, taking the historical context
to consist of multiple elements undergoing change allows us both to explain how the
STE suggested to Einstein that an interpretation of the laws of electromagnetism
without the ether was possible, and to explain why the reaction in the community
at the time were very diverse. For example, the fact that the STE had a different
epistemological effect on Einstein compared to Lorentz can be accounted for by
pointing out that they took different positions with respect to the electromagnetic
and mechanical approaches, that they had different conceptions of how to construct
and evaluate scientific theories, and that they had different conceptions of how to
construct interpretations of the laws of electromagnetism.36
The main difference between (Fac)-(Ind) and (Con)-(Tra) thus comes down to
the following. Adherents of (Fac)-(Ind) assume that the epistemological role of STEs
34With an extra section for the American response between 1912 and 1980.
35Similar approaches to the reception of the theory of special relativity can be found in e.g. Glick
(1987), Jungnickel and McCormmach (1990) or Richard Staley (2008).
36See among others Nersessian (1984, 113 - 119) for a good overview of Lorentz’s longlasting
adherence to the ether as the electrodynamical absolute frame of reference.
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consists in establishing knowledge about the world, and they believe that philoso-
phers should explain this by reference to generic individuals contemplating the STE.
(Con)-(Tra), by contrast, does not place any a priori restrictions on the epistemo-
logical effect of STEs: this is a question that can only be answered on a contextual
case-to-case basis, by looking at the transformations that occur because of the STE’s
formulation, presentation and reception. Approaching STEs in this way has a few
implications that, we believe, could be beneficial for the contemporary philosophical
debate.
First of all, the approach formulated here is schematic. In our discussion of Ein-
stein’s STE, we have focused on three contextual elements: the Maxwell-Lorentz
theory of electromagnetism, the individual scientist Albert Einstein and the funda-
mental physics-community. It could well be, however, for this case or for others, that
other contextual features deserve our attention as well. Miller, for example, refers to
debates about electromagnetic induction in the engineering community at the time
(1981, 154 – 156); Peter Galison (2003) has provided a very detailed and extensive
account about the technology employed for measuring time and simultaneity in the
period of Einstein’s publication. All such contextual features could be included in
our analysis as well. Accordingly, this approach leaves open the different changes
that can occur: the notion of scientific context is flexible (without being an empty
box, we contend). It allows for changes on different levels according to the historical
situation in which the STE in question was formulated and presented.
A second, related implication is that going (Con)-(Tra) makes room for method-
ological pluralism. This is an advantage, because it may allow one to approach
debates such as the one between Brown and Norton from new angles. Between 1986
and 2005 they have argued against each other’s approach by coming up with STEs
from the history of science that they believed could only be explained by their own
approach — platonism and empiricism, respectively — , and not by the other. Up
until now, however, there has not been any clear winner.37 The fact that this debate
37See e.g. Brown’s Why Thought Experiments Transcend Experience (2004) and Norton’s Why
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has been going on for such a long time, without any real end conclusion, suggests
that it is difficult — if not impossible — to argue convincingly that either platonic
inferential leaps or empiricist argument-reductions are the final philosophical word
on STEs. If, on the other hand, we situate the epistemological effect of the STE
within an appropriate scientific context, we need not assume that there is one single
mechanism that explains the whole effect of every possible STE. Einstein’s focus on
principles, together with his insight about the relative existence of the electric field,
explains, for example, why the magnet-conductor STE brought Einstein to raise the
principle of relativity from the status of a conjecture to the status of a postulate. Yet
this cannot explain why certain other scientists did not follow Einstein in taking the
asymmetry to suggest that an interpretation of the laws of electromagnetism without
an ether was possible. To explain this, we would need a mechanism that refers to
their work on the foundations of physics, or to their institutional background, or ...
Rather than searching for the one true mechanism underlying all STEs — as Brown
and Norton seem to do — we believe it to be more fruitful to see these mechanisms
as philosophical tools that allow us to explain why certain changes occurred in the
scientific context because of a particular STE.
A final advantage is that the approach can incorporate parts of the (Fac)-(Ind)
approach. It is perfectly well possible that a particular STE brings about knowledge
of the world for a particular scientist, and that this can be explained by an inductive
argument. This would mean that there are elements within the scientific context
which explain why this scientist reads this particular STE as an inductive argument.
What our approach does not allow for, however, are broad and generalizing claims:
it does not support the claim that all STEs in general have the same epistemological
effect on every individual contemplating them.
We would like to end with two concluding remarks. First: the approach sketched
above is not without risks. Introducing the notion of context could imply the danger
Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Experience (2004b), and the fact that Brown, in the second
edition of his book on STEs (2010, 46 – 48) still uses the same arguments against Norton’s approach.
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of overcontextualization. Any historical element could become part of the STE’s
context. A possible consequence could be that the same STE has radically different
epistemological effects for different philosophers, depending on what they take to
be the relevant context. Moreover, contextualization could also lead to the STE’s
“extinction”: the STE would then become nothing more than a small part of a much
bigger story, which leaves us with the question whether we are still really studying
STEs.
While these are possible risks of the approach presented here, the notion of context
is not a catch-all term: for every particular element that we want to include in an
STE’s scientific context we have to provide good (historical) reasons. This makes
us believe that (Con)-(Tra) can provide a fruitful new approach to the philosophical
study of the epistemological characteristics of STEs. The approach requires us to be
explicit about the historical scientific context in which we want to study and analyse
the functioning of the STE in question. As such, it provides us with a more stable
ground for philosophical disputes about the epistemological specifics of scientific TEs.
Second: does one single case suffice to make our point? Strictly speaking one case
may suffice to show that a position has shortcomings (if it fails to capture important
characteristics of that case). In other words, if our case – which was in itself an
important STE in the history of physics – shows that (Fac)-(Ind) is too narrow, we
have already made some progress. One case of course does not suffice to show that
our (Con)-(Tra) alternative itself is better in general. For that more cases would be
needed. Given that (Con)-(Tra) requires that such cases are investigated with much
attention to historical detail, that would be beyond the scope of the present paper.
We leave the discussion of extra cases for further research.
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